"Free to Beg Or to Fight" Thomas Jefferson and Relations with Barbary, 1785-1805 by Manis Ii, Brett A.
   “FREE TO BEG OR TO FIGHT:” 
THOMAS JEFFERSON AND RELATIONS WITH 
BARBARY, 1785-1805 
 
 
   By 
   BRETT A. MANIS II 
   Bachelor of Arts in History  
   Oklahoma City University 
   Oklahoma City, OK 
   2006 
 
 
   Submitted to the Faculty of the 
   Graduate College of the 
   Oklahoma State University 
   in partial fulfillment of 
   the requirements for 
   the Degree of 
   MASTER OF ARTS 
   July, 2013
ii 
 
“FREE TO BEG OR TO FIGHT”: 
THOMAS JEFFERSON AND RELATIONS WITH 
BARBARY, 1785-1805 
 
 
   Thesis Approved: 
 
   
 
 Dr. Richard C. Rohrs 
 Thesis Adviser 
  
 
  Dr. L.G. Moses 
 
  
 
 Dr. David M. D’Andrea 
iii 
Acknowledgements reflect the views of the author and are not endorsed by committee 
members or Oklahoma State University. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
To Lauren and my girls (Avery, Teryn, and Lillee):  Without your love and support, I 
could not have finished.  This paper is for you. 
 
 
To Mom and Dad:  For helping in any way I needed. 
 
 
To Lace and Ralph, Terry and Claudia:  For taking care of Lauren and the girls while I 
spent far too much time in the library. 
 
 
To Dr. C. Michelle McCargish, for being a great friend and an even better grad school 
mentor (whether you knew you were or not). 
 
 
To Dr. Richard Rohrs, for patience, as well as teaching me to be a much better writer and 
historian.
iv 
 
Name: BRETT A MANIS II   
 
Date of Degree: JULY, 2013 
  
Title of Study: FREE TO BEG OR TO FIGHT:  THOMAS JEFFERSON AND 
RELATIONS WITH BARBARY, 1785-1805 
 
Major Field: HISTORY 
 
Abstract: Thomas Jefferson, with great consistency, supported American action against 
the threat of the Barbary pirates.  His peers and the great powers of Europe during this 
time advocated continuing the established tradition of tribute and ransom.  In contrast, 
Jefferson moderated his calls for war based upon the ability of the United States:  
initially, as part of an international confederation of  smaller nations during the 1780s to 
the sole power willing to fight during his presidency.  Throughout his career, Jefferson 
advocated a position that would not only display American strength, but also affirm his 
belief in the freedom of the seas and commerce. 
 
 
v 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Chapter          Page 
 
I. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................1 
 
 
II. HONOR AND AVARICE IN BARBARY:  JEFFERSON AS  
 DIPLOMAT, 1784-1790........................................................................................15 
  
 
III. ALL THE REST OF THE WORLD IS OPEN:  JEFFERSON AS 
 SECRETARY OF STATE AND VICE PRESIDENT, 1790-1801 .......................40 
 
 
IV. CHASTISE THEIR INSOLENCE: 
 JEFFERSON AS PRESIDENT, 1801-1805 ..........................................................56 
 
  
V.  CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................68 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................74
1 
 
CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
For over two hundred years before the United States gained its independence, the 
Muslim regencies of Barbary used piracy to fund their states and terrorize the Christian 
nations of the Mediterranean.  Though piracy was nothing new in the area, the North 
African regencies amassed power and influence far beyond what their size warranted.  
For years they forced powerful nations to pay tribute to protect Mediterranean commerce.  
By the time of American independence, the regencies were not as strong as in the 
seventeenth century.  Even with their decline, Barbary piracy managed to destroy or 
severely curtail the trade of smaller nations.   
At its root, the word piracy means “sea robber” in Latin or “brigand” in Greek.1  
By the Crimes Act of 1790, the United States defined piracy as “murder or robbery”
                                                           
1
 The Latin word is pirata and the Greek is peirates.  Bruce A. Elleman, Andrew Forbes, and 
David Rosenberg, Naval War College, editors, Piracy and Maritime Crime:  Historical and Modern Case 
Studies, Newport Papers 35 (January 2010), 1. 
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while at sea.1  In an international context, Dutch lawyer Hugo Grotius offered up an 
explanation in his work Mare Liberum.2  Summing up Grotius, Commander Penny 
Campbell of the Royal Australian Navy stated that, beyond the coast, “all states should 
enjoy free access to the high seas and be denied exclusive jurisdiction over them.”3  By 
extension, any piracy was against all nations and beyond the scope of national control, 
generally making the pirate “an outlaw, an enemy of all mankind.”4  Thomas Jefferson 
certainly agreed. 
 In 1784, the United States faced its first war after the American Revolution.  
Algiers, recognizing the loss of British protection, declared war on the United States, 
effectively ending American trade to the Mediterranean.  That same year, Congress 
appointed former Virginia governor Thomas Jefferson to serve on the American 
diplomatic commission in Europe.  Joining Benjamin Franklin and John Adams, 
Jefferson quickly became the strongest advocate for American strength and honor when 
dealing with Barbary.  With Franklin returning to the United States in 1785, Adams 
assumed the unofficial post of senior diplomat and adamantly opposed Jefferson’s ideas 
and strategies.  Undeterred, Jefferson continued his personal crusade against Barbary 
piracy and American inaction throughout his career, culminating in a daring campaign 
that carried the American flag to the shores of North Africa. 
                                                           
 
1
 “Statute II:  Chap. IX – An Act for the Punishment of certain Crimes against the United States.”  
House of Representatives 1st Congress, II Session, 30 April 1790, Statutes at Large, 113-115  
http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage (accessed 27 June 2013) 
 
2
 In English, Freedom of the Seas, published in 1608. 
3
 Penny Campbell, “A Modern History of the International Legal Definition of Piracy” in Piracy 
and Maritime Crime:  Historical and Modern Case Studies, edited by Bruce A. Elleman, Andrew Forbes, 
and David Rosenberg, Naval War College, Newport Papers 35 (January 2010), 20-21. 
4
 Ibid., 21. 
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 Piracy had been an issue in the Mediterranean as far back as ancient times.  By 
the eighteenth century, it had become a largely religious and cultural system.  The 
Muslim states of North Africa5 resorted to piracy not only to finance their economy but 
also as a way to exert power far beyond what they could have by conventional means.  
By terrorizing the commercial shipping lanes of southern Europe, the Barbary States 
commanded tribute from many European kingdoms, both minor and world powers.  
Although they could be used as pawns by both Britain and France, the Barbary States 
terrorized the smaller states of Italy, as well as both Spain and Portugal.  Before 
American independence, the English colonies enjoyed the protection of both the Royal 
Navy and any treaty the Crown signed with the Barbary States.  Upon its rebellion, 
however, the new United States of America lost all protection.  Without a navy capable 
of defending anything beyond their shoreline, and even that was tenuous, the United 
States had no leverage with which to negotiate.   
 Although the idea of American action against Barbary was popular, most in the 
government and diplomatic circles believed it nearly impossible.  Jefferson was among 
the few, and sometimes the only, government official to remain consistent in his 
dedication to securing American commerce and upholding her honor.  What began as a 
personal quest at the beginning of his diplomatic career in 1785 turned into a career-long 
pursuit of action.  Through the course of over twenty years of public service, Jefferson 
continued his calls for a change in not only how the United States dealt with the piracy, 
but also how European nations handled it.  Though characterized as a man of peace and 
                                                           
5
 These states were Morocco, Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli.  Morocco was fully independent while 
the other three owed nominal allegiance to the Ottoman Empire. 
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often labeled a pacifist, Jefferson had no tolerance for the piratical nature of Barbary and 
this profoundly influenced his future actions. 
 Very few works have been written about this topic.  Often, an author devotes a 
chapter to Barbary in the course of a broader history, or focuses entirely on the nature of 
the war with the various Barbary States.  In addition, interest in the subject has ebbed and 
flowed over time.  This work adds to the historical narrative by focusing on the 
diplomatic career of Thomas Jefferson, rather than one specific conflict or only the 
military aspect.  Although Jefferson’s involvement is touched upon in several histories, 
very few extend it beyond his involvement as president during the Tripolitan War of 
1801-1805. 
One of the earliest works is Gardner W. Allen’s Our Navy and the Barbary 
Corsairs.6  Allen presents a narrative history covering roughly forty years of American 
interaction with Barbary, ending after the war with Algiers in 1815.  Allen’s aim is to 
collect the “other adventures of American seamen and consuls among the pirates of the 
Mediterranean” that “have escaped notice, or are barely mentioned in most histories.”7  
Allen presents a straightforward account of the events that serves as a good starting point 
for the American point of view. 
 Louis B. Wright and Julia H. Macleod deliver the more typical focus on General 
William Eaton, the Navy’s agent to the Barbary region, and his attempted capture of 
                                                           
6
 Gardner W. Allen.  Our Navy and the Barbary Corsairs (Boston:  Houghton, Mifflin and 
Company, 1905). 
7
 Allen, Our Navy and the Barbary Corsairs, preface. 
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Tripoli.  In The First Americans in North Africa,8 the authors use Eaton’s letters and 
writings to present their account of his actions.9  They dispute the popular assessment that 
Jefferson was opposed to a standing Navy by claiming that Adams signed the bill to 
reduce the Navy’s strength.10  Their narrative follows Eaton’s exploits before concluding 
that “force, vigorously and intelligently applied, quickly wiped out a nuisance that had 
been the plague of Christendom for more than six centuries.” 11  This would not be the 
last example of exaggeration. 
 Although his work does not fit into the American history on Barbary relations, Sir 
Godfrey Fisher’s Barbary Legend:  War, Trade and Piracy in North Africa, 1415-183012 
serves as a valuable addition to the historiography.  Fisher writes from the British 
perspective and his book is devoted to that viewpoint.  His only mention of the United 
States comes in the preface when he states that the “‘conscience of Europe’ was 
unexpectedly awoken from across the Atlantic.”13 Fisher’s contribution is a thorough 
account of the beginnings of the Barbary regencies.   
 American historians revived interest in the subject during the 1960s.  The largest 
in scope is James Field’s American and the Mediterranean World, 1776-1882.14   Field 
covers the first century of post-independence contact, including a thorough treatment of 
the missionary movement that developed in the mid-to-late eighteenth century.  Although 
                                                           
8
 Louis B. Wright and Julia H. Macleod, The First Americans in North Africa:  William Eaton’s 
Struggle for a Vigorous Policy Against the Barbary Pirates, 1799-1805 (Princeton:  Princeton University 
Press, 1945). 
9
 Wright and Macleod, The First Americans in North Africa, vi. 
10
 Ibid., vi. 
11
 Ibid., 206. 
12
 Sir Godfrey Fisher, Barbary Legend:  War, Trade and Piracy in North Africa, 1415-1830 
(Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1957). 
13
 Ibid. 
14
 James A. Field, Jr., America and the Mediterranean World, 1776-1882 (Princeton:  Princeton 
University Press, 1969). 
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he explores the American use of its Navy as an instrument of policy, Field focuses on 
missionaries.15  Historian Alexander DeConde notes the author relies exclusively on 
English-language sources, showing “no real appreciation for the feelings and cultural 
attitudes of the peoples who were the objects of American policy.”16  Field touches 
briefly on the three-decade-long battle in American foreign policy over how to confront 
the Barbary pirates.  Although his claim that the United States Navy was “a rationalist, 
not a mercantilist, navy,”17the truth is not as black and white.  Jefferson did not only use 
the Navy as a tool of Enlightenment idealism, but also to protect commercial interests.  
Though his actions were not in the mercantile tradition of European countries, it was also 
not Enlightenment idealism, as the author suggests. 
 A more detailed account of the first interaction between the United States and 
Barbary can be found in H.G. Barnby’s The Prisoners of Algiers.18  Barnby goes beyond 
most histories in the breadth in which he covers the topic.  Not only does he provide a 
narrative of the conflict, but he also provides the reader with background and substance 
that places the Algerine War in context.  In giving the history of Algiers and a sketch of 
the people who lived and ruled there, Barnby provides an alternative to the typical 
American-centered story.19  In addition to giving more attention to the Algerines, Barnby 
uses British and French archives to place the conflict in the larger context of European 
                                                           
15
 Alexander DeConde’s review of James A. Field, Jr’s, America and the Mediterranean World, 
1776-1882, in The American Historical Review, 75 (February 1970), 917-919. 
16
 Ibid., 918. 
17
 Field, American and the Mediterranean World, 1776-1882, 18. 
18
 H.G. Barnby, The Prisoners of Algiers:  An Account of the Forgotten American-Algierian War 
of 1785-1797 (London:  Oxford University Press, 1966). 
19
 George W. Knepper’s review of H.G. Barnby’s The Prisoners of Algiers, in The Journal of 
American History, 53 (March 1967), 807-808. 
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diplomacy between the ancien regime and the new Europe forged by the French 
Revolution.20 
 Unusual amongst these historians, Samuel Edwards stands out for focusing on one 
person.  Edwards’s Barbary General:  The Life of William H. Eaton21 offers a 
sympathetic account of the consul-turned-general and his story.  Almost immediately, 
Edwards presents Eaton as a larger-than-life figure who possessed all the qualities needed 
to accomplish anything.  In closing his introduction, Edwards says of Eaton:  “He alone, 
of all Americans, conquered a foreign land with a ragged army of mercenaries, and 
placed his hand-picked puppet on a throne in order to ensure permanent peace in a part of 
the world where peace had been unknown for centuries.”22  Referring to Eaton as 
“America’s ‘Lawrence of Arabia’” only shows the esteem the author feels for the 
subject.23 
 Howard Nash focuses on the chronology of events in his book The Forgotten 
Wars.24  The first half focuses on the Quasi War with France at the end of the Adams 
administration.  Though not related to Barbary, it does give an account of the creation of 
the United States Navy and its first taste of combat.  The second half is a summary of the 
Tripolitan War.  While not offering much in the way of analysis, Nash provides a concise 
history of the conflict.  In addition, the author makes good use government documents 
and official naval correspondence.  If nothing else, the author’s footnotes and 
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 George A. Billias’s review of H.G. Barnby’s The Prisoners of Algiers in The New England 
Quarterly, 40 (June 1967), 299-301. 
21
 Samuel Edwards, Barbary General:  The Life of William H. Eaton (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:  
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968). 
22
 Edwards, Barbary General, 15. 
23
 Ibid., 268. 
24
 Howard Nash, The Forgotten Wars:  The Role of the U.S. Navy in the Quasi War with France 
and the Barbary Wars 1798-1805 (New York:  A.S. Barnes and Company, 1968). 
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bibliography offer a great starting point for the primary documents pertaining to this 
conflict. 
 A great study of Jefferson and his views on war is Reginald Stuart’s The Half-
Way Pacifist.25  Stuart notes “Jefferson did not put his views of war down in a systematic 
manner” and “to structure Jefferson’s thought too rigorously would do violence to its 
eclectic and encyclopaedic [sic] nature.”26  Stuart argues that “Jefferson’s thought on war 
developed as he witnessed and participated in the conflicts of his time, and his attitudes 
varied with circumstances and his own position.”27  While short (only 65 pages of text), 
Stuart adds a valuable narrative on Jefferson’s attitude toward conflict. 
 The subject generated very few new works for the next two decades.  Not until the 
1990s and the early 2000s, following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on New 
York City and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, did historians and journalists 
renew their interest in Barbary.  While most of the early histories focus on the American 
military, the newer histories have tended to correlate the Barbary Wars with the War on 
Terrorism following September 11.  Unfortunately, many of the authors continued the 
traditional approach by focusing on American and (less frequently) European sources, 
 A.B.C. Whipple wrote one of the first books in this “new generation” of studies.  
In To the Shores of Tripoli28 Whipple’s opening line delineates his purpose:  “This is a 
book about America’s first war with an Arab tyrant.”29  Writing in the aftermath of the 
                                                           
25
 Reginald C. Stuart, The Half-Way Pacifist:  Thomas Jefferson’s View of War (Toronto:  
University of Toronto Press, 1978. 
26
 Ibid., x. 
27
 Ibid. 
28
 A.B.C. Whipple, To the Shores of Tripoli:  The Birth of the U.S. Navy and Marines (Annapolis:  
Naval Institute Press, 1991). 
29
 Ibid., 5. 
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United States-led Gulf War against Iraq, Whipple argues that Jefferson “dealt with a 
confrontation strikingly similar to what the United States would face 200 years later.”30  
Whipple exceeds reality to prove his thesis, writing that the Barbary War was “in large 
part responsible for the formation of the United States navy and Marine Corps, and not 
least for weaning a new nation from infancy to adolescence.”31  In advocating this 
position, the author ignores the preceding ten years of American military history.  It was 
the “war” with Algiers32 that caused the government to realize the impotence of 
American power and finally push for the creation of the United States Navy.  Many of the 
officers who made headlines in the Mediterranean first learned the art of war fighting 
against France in the Quasi War from 1798-1800.  While Barbary was important and 
helped solidify American naval force, it was neither the reason nor the only proving 
ground for its development. 
 Expanding this scope to the whole of the early national era, Robert Allison’s The 
Crescent Obscured33 surveys the period from American independence to the war with 
Algiers in 1815.  Allison’s narrative takes on a dogmatic view, contrasting the two sides 
as a conflict between the European and the Turk, the civilized and the barbarian.34  
Viewing the North African Muslims as “the consummate Other,” Allison portrays the 
American war with Tripoli in ideological terms.35  Offering the United States as a nascent 
savior, he writes that the United States did what Europe would not do:  “[beat] the forces 
                                                           
30
 Ibid. 
31
 Ibid., 6, 
32
 Though the Algerine War officially lasted from 1784 to 1797, the United States never sent any 
forces to fight with Algiers and the war was ended with a peace treaty. 
33
 Robert J. Allison, The Crescent Obscured:  The United States and the Muslim World, 1776-
1815 (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1995). 
34
 Ibid., xv. 
35
 Herbert L. Bodman’s review of Robert J. Allison’s The Crescent Obscured in Journal of 
Church and State, 38 (September, 1996), 919. 
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of Islamic despotism and piracy.”36  David Lesch notes that one of Allison’s strengths is 
his study of how American reactions to the “white slavery” of Americans captured by 
Algiers and Tripoli contrasted with their own views of the “African slavery” practiced in 
the United States.  According to Lesch Allison exposes the “moral inconsistency of 
clamoring for the release of the Americans suffering under Barbary captivity while 
overlooking the infinitely more destitute position of African-Americans in the country.”37 
 One of the best works is Richard B. Parker’s Uncle Sam in Barbary.38  C. Edward 
Skeen notes Parker “is the first historian with the background and knowledge of the 
Arabs to explain the first encounter of the United States with Islam meaningfully,” 
having served as an American diplomat in Algeria, Lebanon, and Morocco.39  While 
primarily dealing with Algeria, Parker’s work helps to dispel with the American 
superiority complex that so often dominates the texts relating to Barbary.  Parker uses 
Arabic sources, portrays life in the regencies, and gives a voice to those who have always 
been condemned as anonymous and faceless enemies.40  With his background in the area, 
Parker dismisses the connection to the current challenges and struggles of the United 
States with Islamic terrorism.  Contrasting the two periods, Parker says “the corsairs were 
not terrorists as we understand that term today.  They were not involved in random 
                                                           
36
 Allison, The Crescent Obscured, xvi. 
37
 David W. Lesch’s review of Robert J. Allison’s The Crescent Obscured in Middle East Journal, 
50 (Autumn, 1996), 623-624. 
38
 Richard B. Parker, Uncle Sam in Barbary:  A Diplomatic History (Gainesville:  University of 
Florida Press, 2004). 
39
 C. Edward Skeen’s review of Richard B. Parker’s Uncle Sam in Barbary in The Journal of 
American History, 91 (March 2005), 1437. 
40
 Phillip C. Naylor, in his review, concurs by claiming that the “narrative reanimates and 
humanizes Americans and Maghribis.”  Phillip C. Naylor’s review of Richard B. Parker’s Uncle Sam in 
Barbary in The International Journal of African Historical Studies, 38 (2005), 560-563. 
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killings for political ends.  They were interested in booty and ransom money, and there 
was nothing clandestine about their activities.”41   
 Taking the opposite approach are books by Joseph Wheelan,42 Richard Zacks,43 
and Joshua London.44  Wheelan’s Jefferson’s War has a two-part focus:  Jefferson wanted 
the war and that war was similar to the post-September 11 threats faced by the United 
States.45  Acknowledging that Jefferson’s image has been as a pacifist, Wheelan states 
that Jefferson “was a complicated and sometimes vindictive man with a long memory.”46  
Falling into a similar trap as Whipple, Wheelan argues for a connection between the 
Barbary pirates and the Al Qaeda terrorists that perpetrated the September 11 attacks.  In 
doing so, however, he fails to grasp that “profit, not millenarian ideology, drove the 
Muslim buccaneers of yesteryear.”47 
 Joshua London’s Victory in Tripoli falls into a similar category.  Using his work 
to correlate Barbary with September 11, London describes the war with Tripoli in terms 
of civilization.  London contrasted the “rationalism, progress, and industry” of Europe in 
opposition to the “permanent battle mode, and the glory of jihad” of Muslim North 
Africa.48  London views this conflict in terms of a clash of religions and civilizations; the 
Barbary wars were a continuation of the medieval Crusades and jihads that dominated the 
pre-Enlightenment era.  Bill Weinberg states that, like Wheelan before him, London 
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 Parker, Uncle Sam in Barbary, xiv. 
42
 Joseph Wheelan, Jefferson’s War:  America’s First War on Terror, 1801-1805 (New York:  
Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2003). 
43
 Richard Zacks, The Pirate Coast:  Thomas Jefferson, the First Marines, and the Secret Mission 
of 1805 (New York:  Hyperion, 2005). 
44
 Joshua E. London, Victory in Tripoli:  How America’s War with the Barbary Pirates 
Established the U.S. Navy and Built a Nation (Hoboken, NJ:  John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2005). 
45
 Wheelan, Jefferson’s War, xxiii. 
46
 Ibid., xxiii. 
47
 Review of Joseph Wheelan’s Jefferson’s War in Kirkus Reviews, 13 (July 1, 2003), 903. 
48
 London, Victory in Tripoli, 9-10. 
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portrays the Arabs as “gutless, conniving and greedy (using shameless adjectives like 
‘perfidious’ and ‘irascible’), while ascribing the highest motives to the Americans, even 
while acknowledging that they also engaged in ruses and trickery.”49  Besides inclusion 
of American exceptionalism, London also portrays Jefferson as weak and shows no 
historical appreciation of his many years advocating war against the pirates.50 
 In Pirate Coast, Richard Zacks offers a more recent take on William Eaton and 
his unlikely march across North Africa.  Like Edwards before him, Zacks portrays Eaton 
as the hero and treats those opposite him with scorn.  Zacks is a journalist.  David Skaggs 
argues that, because of this, his work “is a lively written, error-filled volume.”51  He 
shows this in his righteous indignation against Consul General Tobias Lear.  Lear, when 
signing on peace treaty with Tripoli, gave $60,000 for the ransom of the captured 
American seamen.  Zacks either forgets or ignores the fact that the United States paid 
even more in 1796 to secure the Algerine peace treaty under President George 
Washington.52 
 More academic in its approach, Frederick C. Leiner’s The End of Barbary Terror 
chronicles the more neglected war with Algiers in 1815 that ended American tribute to 
Barbary.53  Leiner focuses on Captain Stephen Decatur and his mission to confront 
Algiers after it declared war on the United States.  Though the American Navy focused 
on fighting Great Britain during the War of 1812, the end of that conflict left the United 
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 Bill Weinberg’s review of Joshua London’s Victory in Tripoli and Joseph Wheelan’s Jefferson’s 
War in Middle East Policy, 13 (Fall 2006), 169-175. 
50
 London, Victory in Tripoli, 231, 233. 
51
 David Curtis Skaggs’s review of Richard Zacks’s The Pirate Coast in The Journal of Military 
History, 70 (January 2006), 230-231. 
52
 Richard B. Parker’s review of Richard Zacks’s The Pirate Coast  in Middle East Journal, 60 
(Autumn, 2006), 827-828. 
53
 Frederick C. Leiner, The End of Barbary Terror:  America’s 1815 War Against the Pirates of 
North Africa (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2006). 
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States determined to end the system of tribute.  In Leiner’s words, “the United States 
would speak from the mouths of its cannon” in future dealings with Barbary.54 
 This work contributes to the historical narrative by analyzing Thomas Jefferson’s 
view of Barbary during his career.  Whereas the majority of the books on this topic focus 
on either one small part of the narrative or a broad overview, I have set out to study how 
Jefferson and the Barbary regencies intersected over a twenty year period.  This covers 
the breadth of Jefferson’s service to the United States and shows a maturation of 
American policy and ability toward foreign threats. 
Several factors affected Jefferson’s policy toward the Barbary pirates.  Primarily, 
he seemed determined to protect American trade abroad and defend his country’s honor.  
He wanted to insure access to overseas markets that benefitted American economic 
interests.  He was also concerned about the maintenance of American honor and how 
European countries viewed the new republic.  Though some of his contemporaries 
described the captivity of American sailors in terms of slavery, Jefferson did not use that 
language.  His position as a slave owner may have precluded his use of the term “slave” 
as connecting African slavery to white captivity could have caused tension.  Jefferson’s 
preferred method of achieving those objectives at times contradicts the typical portrayal 
of him as distrustful of the military.  Though his foreign policy preferences usually 
reflected his aversion toward war, Jefferson never wavered in advocating the use of force 
when dealing with the pirates of North Africa. 
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 Ibid., 4. 
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As Jefferson rose through the ranks of the American government, his resolve to 
end tribute and ransom never wavered.  Although he could not claim to be responsible for 
the end of the tribute system, Jefferson’s actions paved the way for that end.  With 
determination and persistence, he did not allow the successive administrations he served 
to ignore the problem.  By the time he retired in 1809, the “pacifist” could rightfully 
claim that he had advocated a stronger and more forceful response than any American 
before him. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
HONOR AND AVARICE IN BARBARY: 
JEFFERSON AS DIPLOMAT, 1784-1790 
 
 For four years, Thomas Jefferson was the chief American diplomat in France and 
one of two for all of Europe.  Jefferson focused his attention on two topics:  piracy and 
trade agreements to enter potential European markets.  Throughout the eighteenth 
century, piracy originating in northern Africa had wide-ranging consequences.  To 
protect themselves, countries paid tribute to the Barbary States or risked having their 
commerce or coastal towns attacked for plunder and slaves.   
 Prior to the American Revolution, the Royal Navy and British treaties of peace 
had protected American shipping.  After the beginning of the Revolutionary War, 
American commerce presented an easy target for the Barbary corsairs.  By the time 
Jefferson landed in France in 1785, Algerine pirates had already captured two American
16 
 
 vessels and enslaved their crews of over twenty sailors.  Jefferson’s arrival coincided 
with an order from the American Congress to negotiate a peace with the North African 
states to secure the release of the prisoners and allow American commerce to enter the 
Mediterranean Sea undisturbed.1 
 During his time in Europe, Jefferson became the predominate voice for the use of 
force to protect American commercial interests abroad.  His debates with John Adams 
and other members of the American government set the tone for Jefferson’s attitudes later 
in his public career as well.  As the junior minister, Jefferson followed Adams’s pace; 
Jefferson “rejected the posture of subservience born of European power politics as being 
incompatible with honor, justice, and the national interest.”2  As such, he looked for 
opportunities for the United States to end forced tribute. 
 Jefferson was aware of several solutions to the problem of piracy.  He did his best 
to analyze each and deduce the best option, especially through his correspondence with 
Adams.  Jefferson’s ideal resolution was for the United States to destroy the pirates and 
open the Mediterranean to shipping.  He also discussed the possibility of sending 
American goods in foreign ships.  This would allow commerce to continue, but at the 
expense of developing an American merchant marine and leaving American commerce at 
the discretion of other countries.  The final option was, simply, to buy peace and maintain 
some form of a tributary relationship with the various Barbary States.3 
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 Parker, Uncle Sam in Barbary, xv, 33. 
2
 Reports on Mediterranean Trade and Algerine Captives (Editorial Note) in [Jefferson’s] Papers, 
34 vols, Julian P. Boyd, ed (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950), 18:  371-372. 
3
 Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, 6 February 1785 in Papers, 7:  639 
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Jefferson wanted to uphold the honor of the United States.  One of his fears was 
that submitting to the Barbary States would hurt his country in more ways than just 
financial.  He firmly believed that justice and honor could only be satisfied if the United 
States fought for the rights of its merchants.  Jefferson said that it would require at least a 
small naval force to protect American cargo.  Otherwise, he feared that “everyone which 
possesses a single ship of the line may dictate to us, and enforce their demands.”4  Such a 
state of affairs would not allow the United States to gain respect among nations, 
especially those European nations that were its chief commercial rivals.5 
Jefferson’s desire to improve the United States’ standing with Europe motivated 
many of his attempts to act against Barbary.  He believed that a tributary system or 
inaction would leave the new republic open to scorn.  Jefferson stated that, “A coward is 
much more exposed to quarrels than a man of spirits.”6  Concerned about the future of 
the United States just two years after the Treaty of Paris of 1783 had secured 
independence, Jefferson wanted to make sure that the European kingdoms, both great and 
small, had no reason to intimidate the young nation. 
Repelling attempts to interfere with the United States coincided with Jefferson’s 
desire for national honor.  Deciding that the United States must maintain some measure 
of defense and that “weakness provokes insult and injury, while a condition to punish it 
often prevents it,” Jefferson enthusiastically supported the creation of a navy.7  He 
believed “a naval force can never endanger our liberties, nor occasion bloodshed; a land 
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force would do both.”8  In addition, it was difficult for any nation except the world 
powers to reach American shores to endanger the United States.  As the Barbary States 
demonstrated, even the pettiest chieftain with some semblance of a naval force could 
strike at any country’s commerce beyond its own waters. 
In addition to honor and strength, Jefferson believed that fighting the pirates was 
more economical than paying tribute.  To those who worried that naval action would cost 
more than other options, Jefferson argued: 
It is not the choice of the states whether they will pay money to cover their 
trade against the Algerines.  If they obtain a peace by negociation [sic] 
they must pay a great sum of money for it; if they do nothing, they must 
pay a great [sum] of money in the form of insurance; and in either way as 
great a one, and probably less effectual than in the way of force.9 
Jefferson believed that money spent as tribute was wasted.  The Dey of Algiers was about 
eighty years of age.  His death would allow his successor to scrap the current treaty and 
demand new presents and possibly higher tribute.  Not only would the United States need 
to offer presents to keep the leaders of the Barbary States from breaking their treaties, but 
consuls would also be needed in each of the regencies.  Without an active agent with 
diplomatic powers, the pirates would break treaties with impunity and American citizens 
would remain captive until the United States’ government sent a new diplomatic mission.  
To Jefferson, showing American strength and resolve in the beginning would allow the 
United States to avoid these other issues.10 
 Jefferson realized that it would be difficult to maintain the force necessary to 
defeat the Barbary powers.  Although he believed them to be weak, he knew the lack of a 
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United States’ Navy negated any chance to overcome the pirates’ ambitions.  Under the 
Articles of Confederation, Jefferson understood that it would be extremely difficult to 
allocate money for a protracted campaign (or even tribute).11  Writing to James Monroe, 
Jefferson showed a desire to have “the confederacy [show] its teeth” and that “the 
[individual] states must see the rod” and face some kind of punishment to get the 
necessary funding.12 
 Jefferson argued that an international confederacy would make it easier to 
suppress the pirates.  This option would not only spread the cost but also the requirement 
for keeping forces off the coast of North Africa.  By having several nations send smaller 
naval contingents, the blockade of the coast would be more effective than relying on one 
country to supply the entire fleet.  This would also allow more nations to participate in 
deciding their relations with the Barbary pirates.13  Jefferson targeted smaller European 
kingdoms and principalities to participate in this confederation.  He knew that both Great 
Britain and France benefited from the pirates because their commercial rivals often had 
their Mediterranean trade plundered and networks disrupted.  Jefferson’s initial hope was 
that France would allow its treaty with Algiers to expire in 1785 and then the United 
States could participate in a joint military expedition.  Jefferson wrote the Comte de 
Vergennes, the French foreign minister for Louis XVI, stating that Jefferson would rather 
the United States fight than “treat with Nations who so barbarously and inhumanly 
commence hostilities against others who have done them no injury.”14  The United States 
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never received a response from Vergennes, who told his agent in Algiers that France had 
“no advantage” in the United States “procuring a tranquil navigation in the 
Mediterranean.”15 
 Jefferson monitored relations between many European countries and Algiers and 
the other states of northern Africa.  He listed several countries as being favorably 
disposed toward an association: Portugal, Naples, Sicily, Venice, Malta, Denmark, and 
Sweden.16  Jefferson hoped that the proposed convention would reduce the American 
contribution to two or three frigates.  The main obstacles were Britain and France.  
Jefferson knew that many of the smaller kingdoms feared the French fleet.  When he 
asked Vergennes about the British reaction to any American action, the French noble 
claimed that Britain would not dare interfere.17 
 Jefferson drafted a proposed convention as a basis for negotiation.  In it, he called 
for all the powers at war with the various states of Barbary to join resources, first against 
Algiers and, then, the remaining states.  The goal was to “compel the pyratical [sic] states 
to perpetual peace, without price, and to guarantee that peace to each other.”18  To 
blockade the Barbary ports efficiently, convention forces would maintain a constant 
cruise with a fleet decided by a quota system.  Ambassadors from the several powers, 
given full authority by their respective governments, would form a committee to manage 
the convention, with voting rights to be determined using the same quota system as the 
military force.  To avoid infighting, Jefferson suggested the new convention come with 
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no salary or honors.  He wanted to avoid the political drama that new titles or income 
would create in a European society based on acquiring them.19   
 To gain legitimacy for his plan, as well as to avoid the embarrassment of publicly 
disagreeing with John Adams, Jefferson enlisted Gilbert du Motier, Marquis de Lafayette 
as the spokesperson for the enterprise.  Jefferson’s hope was that Lafayette would 
influence the courts in Europe and that the United States’ Congress would be more likely 
to heed his plan than if the Virginian worked alone.20  Lafayette eagerly agreed to the 
project and began corresponding with other influential Americans. 
 Lafayette wrote to Jefferson in 1786 suggesting himself as “Chief to the 
Antipiratical Confederacy.”  Lafayette’s plan was to divide responsibilities for the force 
amongst the various members.  He wanted money from Naples, Rome, Portugal, Venice, 
and some of the commercial German towns; naval stores and sailors from the United 
States; a treaty with Malta; and a harbor in Sicily.  He hoped to keep two-thirds of the 
fleet in action at all times while refitting the other third.  He believed that this would 
allow them to crush the pirates and destroy their ships and afford the opportunity for a 
land campaign, should the corsairs be defeated.21 
 Lafayette also wrote George Washington.  Lafayette pointed out that the 
difference between Adams and Jefferson was one of purchasing peace as opposed to 
using those funds to fight an honorable war.  Lafayette pushed Jefferson’s idea of a 
confederation, stating that if each gave “a Sum of Monney [sic] Not Very large” then a 
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“Common Armament May distress the Algerines into Any terms.”22  Lafayette believed 
that with the resources of a strong alliance he could “Crush those Rascals.”23  Though 
Washington’s sentiments lay with Jefferson and Lafayette, Washington found it “almost 
Nugatory to dispute about the best mode of dealing with the Algarines [sic] when we 
have neither money to buy their friendship nor the means of punishing them for their 
depredations.”24  He believed that it was “the highest disgrace” for those nations that paid 
tribute to “such a banditti who might for half the sum that is paid ... be exterminated from 
the Earth.”25   
 Though Jefferson never formally submitted his idea to Congress, delegates from 
his home state of Virginia did.  In July 1787, William Grayson introduced a motion that 
authorized Jefferson, as Minister to France, to form a Confederation of European powers 
for war against Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli.26  Grayson’s motion declared that United 
States would seek to join a military alliance with any European nation “who are now at 
War with the piratical States ... or may be disposed to go to War with them.”27  It called 
on the Confederation to remain allied for the duration of the war.  In addition, the 
Confederation would secure peace, with the threat of continued war as a means of 
enforcement.  Following Jefferson’s vision, it called for the Confederation to form a 
quota system to provide men and materiel, as well as set up a command system that was 
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amenable to the nations involved.28  In a victory for Jefferson, Congress carried this 
motion by a vote of nine states to one29 and ordered John Jay, as Secretary for Foreign 
Affairs, to instruct Jefferson to create the Confederation.30   
 There were also indications of agreement from other countries.  The Queen of 
Portugal ordered her navy to seal the Straits of Gibraltar and blockade the Algerine 
corsairs in the Mediterranean.  Furthermore, she ordered her ships to guard American 
vessels as if they belonged to her own subjects.31  P.R. Randall, an American diplomat in 
Spain, informed both Jefferson and Adams that the Portuguese envoy stated he “would 
rather see a Confederacy framed against the Barbary States,” as he had no hope of his 
country securing peace through negotiation.32 
 John Adams disagreed with Jefferson on nearly every point.  Adams, as the senior 
diplomat,33 usually dictated the terms by which he and Jefferson operated.  Jefferson 
aided this by adhering to protocol and demurring to Adams whenever they disagreed.  
Adams’s understanding of the economics of tribute and war differed from Jefferson’s, as 
well as his belief that a peace would end problems with the Barbary States.34  These 
differences altered the way the commissioners handled the situation, but did not stop 
Jefferson’s drive for an honorable solution. 
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 Adams never denied his distaste for tribute and a purchased peace.  Although he 
advocated this position with tenacity, it was not his preferred solution.  There were two 
reasons he thought it was easier to pay than to fight.  First, he believed that the American 
government and the individual American states, were incapable of coming to a 
consensus.35  Second, he argued that as long as the major European states favored tribute 
over war, the United States could not destroy the pirates.36 
 Adams’s primary dispute with Jefferson revolved around whether it would be 
cheaper to pay tribute or wage war.  While Jefferson believed that a war, especially in 
cooperation with other states, would be cheaper, Adams argued that the war would be 
more expensive.  Adams estimated that the United States could buy peace with all four 
Barbary regencies, as well as the Ottoman Empire, for £200,000 - £300,000.37  Jefferson 
disputed this, saying that after presents for Ottoman ministers and the peace treaty, any 
agreement with the Porte “would be ineffectual towards opening to us the Mediterranean 
until a peace with Algiers can be obtained.”38  Adams responded that the loss of trade and 
the drastic increase in insurance rates would cost more than his estimated sum for peace.  
To illustrate his point, Adams asserted that the interest payments, loans, and debts for a 
war would cost ten times more than paying tribute.39 
 Adams also believed that the United States lacked the resolve to combat piracy.  
Arguing that the United States “ought not to fight them at all, unless ... determine[d] to 
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fight them forever,” Adams wrote that “this thought is ... too rugged for our People to 
bear.  To fight them at the Expence [sic] of Millions and make peace after all by giving 
more Money and larger Presents than would now procure perpetual Peace Seems not to 
be Economical.”  He believed that a purchased peace was the only solution that the 
American people would support. 40 
 Other problems Adams found with Jefferson’s argument were related to execution 
and planning.  Adams argued that while defeating Algiers would be a great achievement 
for the new republic, it alone “would not obtain Peace with Morocco Tunis or Tripoli 
[sic], so that our Commerce would still be exposed.”41  He calculated that Jefferson had 
underestimated the force necessary to defeat the pirates.  Adams feared that any 
American naval force would only exacerbate the situation.  While favoring a standing 
navy,42 Adams believed that the Algerines were too strong for the United States to defeat 
easily.  He estimated a force of at least fifty gunboats would be required and reminded 
Jefferson that a formidable wall surrounded Algiers, which made any enterprise more 
difficult.43 
 Despite his arguments, Adams desired an American victory against piracy.  He 
stated that “if our States could be brought to agree [to fight], I Should be very willing to 
resolve upon eternal War with them.”44  His main fear was that the American public 
would not support it.  He thought that neither his calls for tribute nor Jefferson’s case for 
war would be adopted and found the lack of a response was “more humiliating … than 
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giving the Presents.”45  Adams wrote that the pirates had turned the Christian world into 
cowards and knew that glory and honor awaited an American victory.  As much as he 
desired the defeat of the pirates, he did not trust his people or his government to take 
action due to a lack of resolve.46 
 Others sided with Adams.  Two of the most vocal were Richard O’Bryen47 and 
William Carmichael.  O’Bryen was the captain of an American merchant ship captured 
by the Algerines in 1785.  He was the main source of information from Algiers and 
corresponded frequently with all the American diplomats in Europe.  William Carmichael 
was the American representative in Spain, and Jefferson often used him as a liaison with 
American agents in Barbary.48 
 As a captain, the Algerines treated O’Bryen relatively well.  As such, he became 
very knowledgeable about Algiers and was a reliable source of intelligence for the 
American commissioners.  O’Bryen listed numerous reasons for a quick peace with 
Algiers.  His primary concern was money.  He was convinced that the European powers 
were encouraging Algiers to remain at war with the United States to “reap such benefits 
in being the carriers of our commerce.”49  O’Bryen asked Jefferson to consider the 
amount of insurance American merchants paid just to cross the Atlantic and believed that 
they could better use that money to buy peace.50  O’Bryen also believed that fighting a 
war would be too expensive.  Because the Algerines did not have a merchant marine, 
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there would be no profit in capturing their ships.  As such, the United States’ government 
would have to build, equip, and maintain the force sent to the Mediterranean.51   
O’Bryen stated that the objective had to be a purchased peace.  Without it, the 
United States would never develop as a commercial nation and would expend far too 
much money in a war without a definite conclusion.  He argued that any “delays breed 
danger and opportunity once lost is not easily recovered” but that “money is the God of 
Algiers and Mahomet their prophet.”52  The captain said it was necessary that the United 
States appoint a consul to Algiers who was familiar with the local politics.  Such a move, 
with a well-defined plan for peace, had a great chance of success.  Should purchasing a 
peace fail, however, the United States should immediately build a fleet to “change [the] 
tone of peace.”53 
 While Jefferson discussed the options, he and Adams agreed that a diplomatic 
mission to Algiers must begin immediately.  John Lamb54 arrived in September 1785 
with orders from Congress granting Adams and Jefferson the power to appoint 
negotiators55 to the Barbary States.56  In September 1785, Jefferson proposed that Lamb 
become the American agent in Algiers and Adams approved.57 
 The commissioners would not hear from Lamb again until March 1786.  During 
the interim, Lamb travelled to Algiers and appraised the situation.  His first letter was less 
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than positive.  He wrote that without a great increase in funds, the American government 
should abandon its attempts at purchasing peace.  He reported that the minimum required 
was $1,200 per prisoners for twenty-one prisoners, or $25,200.58  
 Lamb believed that in addition to the cost, the United States needed to placate the 
Porte in Constantinople.  Though Algiers and the other Barbary regencies operated 
independently, they owed nominal allegiance to the Ottoman Sultan.  Lamb believed that 
it would “cost a Tower to Constantinople.”  He argued that even though the Barbary 
States acted independently of the Ottomans in most areas, getting the North African 
potentates to make peace required friendly relations with the Sultan.  To do this, Lamb 
recommended a present of five thirty-six-gun frigates.59  Thomas Barclay60 concurred.  
Quoting Count D’Espilly, the Spanish minister to Algiers, Barclay wrote that the United 
States could expect no more than a truce until Congress sent a minister to 
Constantinople.61  Jefferson then suggested to Adams that peace was possible “but at a 
price far beyond our powers” and that they should send Lamb back to Congress for 
further instructions.62 
 While the ministers deliberated, Lamb stayed in Algiers and prepared a report for 
Adams and Jefferson.  Lamb noted that it was apparent he did not have the funds to 
secure peace.  In April 1786, he met with the Dey, but “he would not speake of Peace, 
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[and] set the Slaves at a most Exorbitent price, far beyond my limits.”63  Even after two 
more meetings and a reduction in price, Lamb reported the cost was enormous.64 
 Attempting to use backchannels, Lamb gave presents to an interpreter in the hope 
that the man might influence events in favor of the United States.  The interpreter 
responded by informing Lamb that there would be no negotiating so long as Algiers had 
no treaty with Spain.  The Algerine demands on the United States were only to make 
their demands on Spain seem more modest.65 
 Lamb reported that a treaty with Constantinople would be of no use.  The 
Algerines felt they had “an intire [sic] rite [sic] to make Peace or war without the voice of 
the Grand Segnor [Sultan], and that they were under no control by the Ottoman 
port[e].”66  Lamb believed that a letter from the French but not the Spanish would be 
much more helpful.  This did not help the United States because the French offered no 
assistance, but the Spanish did.67 
 Lamb reported that the price for the twenty-one captives was 59,496 Spanish 
milled dollars.  Algiers’s tactic was evident in that they demanded Spain pay around 1.5 
million Spanish milled dollars for the redemption of just over 1,100 captives.68  After 
adding in the cost of making peace, Spain would pay more than three million dollars for 
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peace with Algiers.69  Even with this extremely high price, Lamb advised the 
commissioners to make peace, for that would cost less than it would to fight for a year.70 
 Lamb was not the only person in Algiers who reported to Jefferson.  Richard 
O’Bryen, the captive merchant captain, also reported on Lamb’s mission.  O’Bryen wrote 
that Lamb delayed arriving in Algiers and made no effort to learn the local customs on 
captive redemption.  Lamb offered the Dey $10,000, but he demanded $50,000 because 
Lamb advertised that he had cash.  O’Bryen wrote that, “we are much surprized that Mr. 
Lamb should bring so trifling a sum as five or six thousand dollars to redeem 21.”71  
O’Bryen further stated that Lamb was inconsistent.  Lamb would alternately claim his 
funds were in Holland, Spain, or that the commissioners did not authorize him to draw 
more than £3,300 and that one Mr. Randal must write the order.72 
 Barely a month later, O’Bryen reported that Lamb had agreed to redeem the 
captives and left to get the funds.  An Algerine close to the captives reported that Lamb 
had agreed to the $50,000 price demanded by the Dey and would have it within four 
months.73  This contradicted the letter Lamb wrote O’Bryen that he was waiting for 
direction from Adams and Jefferson, in addition to limiting the ransom to $200 per 
captive.74  O’Bryen begged Jefferson to inform him of the actual situation, saying that the 
captives needed to hear of “our redemption or if it is our hard lot here to remain.”75  
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Through all of this, O’Bryen bluntly told Jefferson that Lamb was unfit to negotiate a 
peace.76 
 O’Bryen also expressed frustration to William Carmichael, the United States’ 
envoy in Spain.  O’Bryen believed “Mr. Adams [and] Mr. Jefferson acted for the best, 
but ... it was badly planned [and] worse executed.”77  Congress and the commissioners 
were at fault.  The commissioners ordered Lamb to redeem the captives at $100 per man 
and to provide up to $6,000 for presents to the Dey.  O’Bryen was unsure how any man 
“could think we possibly could be redeemed at that price.”78 
 O’Bryen believed that peace was possible with Algiers, but not only was Lamb 
“losing a very favorable opportunity,” but his actions also jeopardized the “peace which 
is of very great importance to the United States.79  O’Bryen further characterized Lamb 
as a conniving agent with dangerous intentions.  Lamb’s plan, according to the captain, 
was “to set all Europe a fighting or to take some of the Spanish territory in America & 
thereby oblige the Spaniards to make our peace.”80       
 Even without this information, Jefferson pondered whether to alter Lamb’s 
mission.  In early May 1786, Jefferson wrote Adams that letters from agents around the 
Mediterranean proved that “our peace is not to be purchased at Algiers but at a price far 
beyond our powers” and wondered whether they should send Lamb back to Congress so 
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that body could decide on the next move.81  Jefferson acted on his inclination and recalled 
Lamb.  Jefferson’s rationale was that the mission had lost any chance of success within 
the financial parameters, and Congress must now “chuse [sic] to buy a peace, to force 
one, or to do nothing.”82 
 Adams agreed.  Showing his disgust with the process, he declared,  
It would be imprudent in us, as it appears to me to incurr [sic] any further 
Expence, by sending [a diplomatic mission] to Constantinople, or to 
Algiers, Tunis, or Tripoli.  It will be only so much Cash thrown away, and 
worse, because it will only increase our Embarrassment, make us and our 
Country ridiculous, and irritate the Appetite of these Barbarians already 
too greedy.83 
 While Jefferson and Adams lamented the status of negotiations and the lack of 
information from Lamb, the American agent to Algiers wrote two letters to Jefferson 
explaining the situation.  Writing from Alicante in eastern Spain, Lamb said that he was 
unable to travel to the United States due to poor health, but the commissioners were 
correct that the expense of resolving the situation in Algiers would be great.84  In a 
follow-up letter, Lamb stated that he forwarded his correspondence to Congress, and gave 
them “a full account of all my Proceedings as if I were present my Self.”85  He did not 
offer much hope for future prospects but believed “it is out of the Power of the United 
States to force [the Algerines] to a compliance of a peace.”86  While reiterating that his 
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conduct was appropriate, he implored Jefferson to take counsel from his reports and no 
others.  Lamb declared that no other person knew the truth of his actions or his mission.87 
 William Carmichael, the American envoy to Spain, sent his own report to 
Jefferson.  Lamb had sent his resignation to Carmichael as well as Jefferson, blaming ill 
health.88  Carmichael reported that, though now based in Spain, Lamb continued to 
communicate with the Algerine Minister of the Marine.  Carmichael believed that the 
negotiations with Algiers were tenuous in that “the Algerines ought to think we wish to 
have peace with them, at the same time that we do not fear their hostilities.”89  
Carmichael admitted that Lamb had been “extremely Zealous for the Interests of his 
Country,” but doubted whether “he has the qualifications necessary for a Negotiator.”90  
In his short time in Algiers, Lamb had managed to upset the consuls from Spain and 
France, the United States’ only major allies in the region.91 
 Jefferson was less than pleased as he received information from around the 
Mediterranean.  He notified John Jay, serving as Secretary of Foreign Affairs for 
Congress, that the commissioners had recalled Lamb for debriefing.92  As Jefferson 
received the more letters from Lamb and Carmichael showing that Lamb declined to 
return to the United States, Jefferson began to grow suspicious.  He wrote James Monroe 
that he feared “some malversation” with Lamb.93  Jefferson did not blame Lamb for the 
failure to secure peace.  Jefferson believed that an “Angel sent on this business, and so 
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much limited in his terms, could have done nothing.”  Yet, he did not believe Lamb was a 
“proper agent,” if Congress opted for renewed negotiation.94 
Jefferson and Adams attempted to force the issue.  Jefferson instructed 
Carmichael to stop all payments to Lamb.95  With input from Adams, Jefferson also 
prepared new instructions for Lamb.  The Commissioners acknowledged his handicap but 
again ordered him to return to the United States to brief the government.  They informed 
him that Congress alone could settle his accounts and requested that he return his letter of 
credit.96  Even with these specific instructions, Lamb told the commissions he could not 
leave Alicante.  He agreed to return his letter of credit but conditionally.  He said he 
would wait for “the first safe hand” because “by post all my letters are broke” and 
showed signs of inspection.  He agreed not to draw on any more credit. 97  
 Jefferson’s frustration with Lamb did not diminish, even after Congress dismissed 
him.  Jefferson directed Carmichael and Barclay to meet with Lamb in Spain and settle 
his accounts, as well as retrieve any sensitive papers he still possessed.  When Barclay 
arrived at Alicante in November 1786, Lamb had departed for Minorca.  Rather than 
follow him, Barclay returned to France.  Lamb ceased communication with the American 
diplomats for several months.  Not until May 1787 did he write Jefferson, informing him 
that someone covered his cipher in vinegar (presumably to damage it and deny its use to 
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others).  Lamb also stated that he had no plan to travel anywhere else in Europe but rather 
to return to New York City.98   
Lamb not only failed to procure a peace or redeem captives, but he also hurt the 
American cause in Algiers.  The Dey of Algiers considered Lamb’s attempt at negotiation 
as a binding agreement, and believed that the United States had failed to fulfill its 
obligation of paying cash for the ransom.99  Although Adams argued that he and 
Jefferson were not responsible for Lamb’s conduct, future American diplomats had to 
correct Lamb’s mistakes.100 
 After 1786, American interaction with Barbary declined.  As the weakness of the 
Articles of Confederation became overwhelming and the states began debating the 
proposed Constitution, congressional action was limited.  There were a few motions 
debated and carried; however, the results were generally disappointing.  Much of the 
discussion that occurred was negative in the sense that action was unlikely.  Jay informed 
Jefferson that while the captivity was “much to be lamented,” Congress could not pay for 
the captives’ release.101  In return, Jefferson pleaded that redemption and peace be kept 
separate during the initial negotiations.  He feared the Algerines would increase the price, 
which would “form the future tariff,” potentially causing them to abandon their actions 
against others so that they could focus on American shipping.102 
                                                           
98
 John Lamb to Thomas Jefferson, 20 May 1787, in ibid., 11:  368; William Carmichael to 
Thomas Jefferson, 25 March 1787, in Papers, XI:  236.  Congress relocated to New York City for much of 
the 1780s. 
99
 Richard O’Bryen to Thomas Jefferson, 28 April 1787, in ibid., 322. 
100
 John Adams to Thomas Jefferson, 25 January 1787, in ibid., 66. 
101
 John Jay to Thomas Jefferson, 14 December 1786 in ibid., 10:  597.  
102
 Thomas Jefferson to John Jay, 1 February 1787 in ibid., 11:  101. 
36 
 
 In July 1787, Congress authorized Jefferson to explore the formation of his anti-
piracy confederation.  This validation of Jefferson’s plan did last long.  In a letter dated 2 
August 1787, John Jay responded to Congress on American abilities to wage war.  While 
noting, “it would always be more for the Honor and Interest of the United States to prefer 
War to Tribute,” Jay listed the difficulties.103  Due to the current state of finances and 
resources, the United States was unable to create and maintain a naval force to contribute 
to the proposed-antipiracy Confederation.  He argued that Representative Grayson’s 
motion was based on opinion.  According to Jay, American commerce had declined 
rapidly, due to the “inefficiency of the national Government.”104 
 Jay continued that it was “with great Regret” that he was “obliged to consider the 
Motion in Question as rendered unseasonable by the present State of our Affairs.”  The 
United States could only fulfill any quota placed upon it with difficulty, if at all.  He 
believed it was impossible for the United States to build, outfit, and maintain a force of 
three frigates.  His final recommendation was to wait until American finances improved 
to the point that Congress could maintain a naval force and the United States would have 
the opportunity to lead such a force, rather than depend on others.105 
 Even before receiving this information from Jay, Jefferson continued to work on a 
diplomatic solution.  Maintaining his reliance on the Catholic Mathurin order of France, 
Jefferson wrote to the Commission of the Treasury for Congress.  Noting that the 
Mathurins often redeemed French prisoners for less than $400 per man, Jefferson hoped 
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that they could keep the price for American sailors near $500.  At that price, with twenty-
one captives,106 it would cost the United States a minimum of $10,000.107 
 Congress accepted a higher estimate than the Mathurins.  According to a report 
issued in July 1787, Congress allocated $6,000 for a master of the vessel, $4,000 for 
mates, and $1,500 for common seamen.  Of the twenty-one captives, two were masters, 
four mates, and fifteen common seamen.  This totaled $50,500 for the American captives 
in Algiers, although the report expressed confidence that Jefferson could reduce the price 
below the $40,769 left in the fund for redemption.108 
 Jefferson wrote to Jay the following day informing him that he would continue 
diplomatic efforts.  Jefferson stressed the need for secrecy about the Mathurin Order, as 
the Dey of Algiers had made the Spanish minister the guarantor of the American captives 
after his attempts to help.109  This hurt the American effort as the Dey held the Spanish 
minister at the price which Spain redeemed her captives—a price higher than any paid 
before.110  As such, Jefferson said, “I shall pay no attention therefore to the Spanish 
price,” as paying such a high ransom would make American merchantmen the primary 
target of the pirates.111 
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 Jefferson also instructed William Carmichael to dispel any belief that the United 
States’ government was attempting redemption.  Jefferson knew that more Algerine 
captures of American ships would make the price too high for Congress.  He urged that 
the Americans “must never make it [the Algerines’] interest to go out of the streights [sic] 
in quest of us, and we must avoid entering into the streights [sic], at least till we are rich 
enough to arm in that sea.”112  Jefferson saw his determination to avoid tribute borne out 
when the pirates began taking Neapolitan vessels captive only three months after their 
peace treaty.  Captain O’Bryen declared that “no principal of national honor will bind 
those people,” and “there is very little confidence to be put in the royal word.”113 
 Thomas Jefferson left Europe in 1789 to become George Washington’s Secretary 
of State.  During his time in France, he attempted to advance the American struggle 
against the Barbary States and piracy.  Though he failed, Jefferson pushed for a new 
approach.  Although the standard response was to placate the pirates with tribute and 
bribes, Jefferson advocated military action.  The Virginian believed that national honor 
was at stake, and anything less than victory would result in disrepute.  
 Although the United States secured an advantageous peace with Morocco in 1787, 
Algiers was by far the most dangerous of the regencies.  Though American knowledge of 
the workings of Barbary increased tremendously, Jefferson’s mission of redemption or 
peace failed.  The United States had not made peace with Algiers when he left Europe, 
nor was the country prepared to retrieve her citizens militarily.   
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 Congress’ ineffectiveness, the poor character of John Lamb, and the avarice of the 
regencies all doomed Jefferson’s attempt.  He remained committed to an honorable and 
noble result, only for the powers to which he answered to thwart him.  Though Jefferson 
carried his desire for a peace into his own presidency, he was unable to accomplish 
anything while in Europe.
40 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 
“ALL THE REST OF THE WORLD IS OPEN”: 
JEFFERSON AS SECRETARY OF STATE AND VICE PRESIDENT, 1790-1801 
 
Jefferson’s tenure as an American diplomat in Europe ended in 1789.  He returned 
to a country adjusted to the rigors of independence.  The Constitution, recently ratified to 
replace the Articles of Confederation, called for the creation of an executive branch.  
George Washington, the country’s first president, requested that Jefferson assume the 
post of the country’s top diplomat, Secretary of State. 
After five years abroad, Jefferson accepted the post early in 1790.  Although now 
tasked with more than just negotiating trade agreements and dealing with pirates, the 
Barbary issue remained.  Algiers had been the primary problem in North Africa during 
his time as minister, though the 1790s saw Tripoli and Morocco come to the fore as well.  
In fact, the situation was becoming so dire that Washington told Congress, “So many 
circumstances unite in rendering the present state of [our captives] distressful to us that
41 
 
you will not think any deliberations misemployed which may lead to [their] relief and 
protection.”1 
One of Jefferson’s first tasks was to report on the status of the American captives 
in Algiers.  When the House of Representatives sent the new Secretary of State a petition 
from the captives, Jefferson hoped that “certain measures… might prove effectual” in 
redeeming them.  New information, however, “weakened those expectations.”2 
Jefferson offered the House a brief history of the crisis in late 1790, reporting that 
Algerine pirates captured twenty-one captives from the American ships Maria of Boston 
and Dauphin of Philadelphia.  Jefferson explained that the commissioners in Europe, 
appointed before the capture “thought it their duty to undertake that ransom [of the 
prisoners], fearing that the captives might be sold” if they waited for Congress to act.  
Acting on a limited budget, the commissioners restricted their agent to $200 per captive 
in ransom, expecting that Congress would reject a higher price.3 
The $200 limit was lower than the ransom just paid by the French and proved too 
low.  The Dey of Algiers, meeting with the American agent, demanded that the United 
States’ government pay $59,496 for the return of the twenty-one captives, averaging to 
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$2,833.14 per captive.  The agent returned without coming to any agreement, and the 
prisoners remained in Algiers.4 
At the time, the United States’ government, through agents, paid the captives a 
allowance for necessities.  The Mathurins5 suggested, and Jefferson implemented, a 
reduction in that allowance.  The Mathurins reasoned that too much income would lead 
the Dey and his ministers to believe the United States was capable of paying high 
ransom.6  Jefferson knew that the first ransom paid would set the precedent for 
subsequent American efforts, so he desired to keep the price as low as possible.  He 
lowered the allowance and even feigned coolness toward the captives in an attempt to 
convince the Algerines that their American prisoners had a lower value than they hoped.  
Jefferson knew the captives had to suffer without knowledge of his plan, as any leaked 
information could leave redemption unlikely, if not impossible.7 
Just as negotiations began, other European countries altered the situation.  Spain, 
Russia, and Naples made peace with Algiers and “redeemed [their captives] at exorbitant 
sums.”8  In addition, the redemption of large numbers of Europeans made slaves a scarce 
commodity on the Barbary Coast and left the Dey less eager to sell.  The commissioners, 
aware their original target of $200 per person was inadequate, authorized the Mathurins 
to increase the price to $550 per person.  Unfortunately, internal French politics 
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preempted any action.  In a wave of anti-monastic legislation, the Mathurins were 
dispossessed of their lands and funds, forcing a suspension of all their activities.9 
Between 1785 and 1790, the estimates for ransom ranged from $1,200 to $2,920 
per person.  Though the Dey of Algiers demanded $2,833 per person, John Lamb offered 
$1,200 in 1786.  This was, by far, the lowest price during this period.  Spain paid $1,600 
per person for her peace in 1786, while Russia paid $1,546 in 1787.  Captain O’Bryen 
increased his estimate for ransom from $1,800 in 1788 to $2,920 in 1789.10  Just prior to 
submitting his report, Jefferson received word that Britain recently redeemed a sailor for 
$1,481.  Jefferson estimated that, with a 50 percent increase for the two American 
captains, the United States could redeem its captives for an average of $1,571.11 
Jefferson was adamant that the American government had to take some action to 
secure the release of its citizens.  He even went so far as to advocate the creation of a 
small naval force and the capture Algerine sailors.  Acknowledging that the Algerines 
only occasionally ransomed their own sailors, Jefferson offered the capture of Turkish 
sailors as an alternative.  He argued that should the United States put pressure on 
Algiers’s imperial sovereign, the Turks would force Algiers to deal with the United States 
in a more advantageous way.12 
Economic realities also concerned Jefferson.  With Algerine pirates operating 
with impunity, American commerce in the region was virtually nonexistent.  Jefferson 
lamented the loss of those valuable markets for American exports.  He informed 
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Washington that the redemption of captives related directly to the alleviation of American 
economic fortunes in the region, saying the “distresses of both proceed from the same 
cause” and “the relief of the one may, very probably, involve the relief of the other.”13 
In Jefferson’s report to Congress, trade was critical.  For various reasons, many 
states lost their records during the Revolution.  Jefferson was not, therefore, able to find 
exact figures on colonial trade.  His best estimate showed just how significant of an 
economic loss the United States faced.  He estimated that the colonies shipped one-sixth 
of their wheat and flour, one-fourth of their dried or pickled fish, as well as Carolina rice, 
to the Mediterranean.14  Hostilities, as well as the loss of British naval protection, ended 
this trade early in the Revolutionary War.15 
Without British protection, American commerce was at the mercy of every 
country with a naval force.  The United States disbanded the Continental Navy after 
independence, leaving the new republic no way of protecting its commercial interests 
around the world.  American merchants knew that, without British protection, “their 
adventures into [the Mediterranean] sea would be exposed to the depredations of the 
piratical States on the coast of Barbary.”16  Jefferson declared that the only way 
American commerce in the region could resume was to “bring that war to an end, or to 
palliate its effects.”17 
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Though insuring American ships was another option, albeit an extremely 
expensive one, Jefferson’s first suggestion was a diplomatic convention in which Algiers 
would exchange captured Americans at a fixed rate.18  He acknowledged that the price set 
for American sailors would be high, though he declined to give an estimate.  He also 
feared that, given a guaranteed ransom for American sailors, the convention “may tempt 
[Algerine] cupidity to seek our vessels particularly.”19 
Jefferson informed Congress that lack of military experience in the Mediterranean 
left the United States without guidance.  As the Mediterranean was, essentially, an inland 
sea with only one point of entrance or exit, any nation using that route faced greater 
danger than a nation with direct access to the sea.  French or Spanish commerce would be 
harder to capture as their coastlines offered multiple points of origin and safe harbors.  
Conversely, American commerce had to enter through the Straits of Gibraltar, creating a 
bottleneck20 where Algerine and other pirates concentrated.21  With that threat of 
captivity, the best sailors would choose to go elsewhere, as “all the rest of the world is 
open.”22 
If a continual threat to commerce was too much to accept, Congress could 
emulate the European nations in the centuries-old practice of purchasing peace.  
Declaring that these nations “[count] their interest more than their honor,” Jefferson gave 
numerous examples of what a peace would entail.  He estimated the range from $60,000 
to $1,000,000.  Spain, the most recent country to make peace, paid between $3 and $5 
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million.  Jefferson did not know the amount paid but he knew the French gave the Dey 
presents every ten years to maintain their treaties.23 
Even if the United States signed a treaty, Jefferson warned that a strong naval 
force would be required to maintain any agreement.  Without a navy, the pirates would be 
free to break the treaty at their whim and attempt to obtain more ransom.  Even a navy 
was no guarantee, as both the French and Spanish suffered seizures soon after signing 
their treaties with Algiers.24  The Algerines occasionally refused peace with certain 
countries so they could continue to capture ships.  Jefferson admitted that Algiers could 
reject an advantageous offer if they deemed piracy was more beneficial than ransom.25 
Jefferson’s third option was war.  Advocating this alternative since his time as the 
American minister to France, Jefferson estimated the Algerines possessed six chebecks26 
and four galleys.  He expected that, in case of conflict, the Ottoman Sultan would send a 
forty-gun frigate and two cruisers to assist its vassal.27  Jefferson’s contacts informed him 
that these ships would not fare well against “the broadside of a good frigate,” but the 
Algerines built ships to be fast and cheap.  They had different caliber guns, often on the 
same ship, and their skill level was low.  Most ships aimed to board as quickly as 
possible to allow man-to-man combat instead of naval gunnery.  He also noted that the 
Dey did not own all the ships, and, as such, he did not control every cruise.28 
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Though currently at peace with most of Europe’s major powers, Algiers’s corsairs 
remained active in the Mediterranean.  At the time of Jefferson’s report, Algiers engaged 
in piratical operations against Russia, Portugal, and several Italian states.  Jefferson used 
that fact to push, once again, his idea of a Confederation of small nations at war with 
Algiers.  He noted the United States had a friendly power in Portugal, which had earlier 
closed the Straits of Gibraltar to Algiers for five years.29  Jefferson wanted to create an 
alliance with Portugal before that country made peace with Algiers.  Should that happen, 
Jefferson believed, “the Atlantic will immediately become the principal scene of their 
piracies.”30 
A committee on trade reported to the Senate in January 1791 and supported 
Jefferson’s views on Algiers.  They advised that American trade to the Mediterranean 
“cannot be protected but by a naval force.”31  Urging action, the committee recommended 
establishing an American navy, as quickly as the funding became available.32  Less than a 
month later, the Senate gave formal direction to President Washington.  In a resolution 
passed on 1 February 1791, the Senate advised him to “take such measures as he may 
think necessary for the redemption of the citizens of the U.S. now in captivity at Algiers,” 
allowing expenditures up to $40,000.33  On 22 February, Washington responded that he 
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would conform to the resolution, as soon as the House of Representatives appropriated 
the money.34 
While the American government continued debating the best course of action, the 
prisoners in Algiers languished in captivity.  Unlike the American system of slavery, the 
Algerines used Christian captives as aides to many of the high-ranking officials in the 
Dey’s palace.  Captain O’Bryen reported that captive George Smith was Chamberlain to 
the Effendi Vickelhadge General, who also acted as Minister for Foreign Affairs.  Smith 
used his position to tell Vickelhadge of the advantages of the United States.  As Algiers 
was a sea-faring nation, Smith described his country’s abundant forests for shipbuilding, 
as well as all the other components necessary to construct a formidable warship.35  Using 
the assertion that “no nation in the world … builds such fine and fast sailing Cruisers as 
the Americans” as a bargaining piece, Smith stated the United States only wanted an 
honorable peace with Algiers.36 
Hearing that the United States could provide these shipbuilding supplies in lieu of 
money, Vickelhadge confided in Smith that Algiers “would make a Peace with America 
on as easy Terms as possible.”37  Vickelhadge offered to be “a friend and Advocate” of 
the United States at court, promoting peace.  Proving that Algerine avarice manifested 
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even in professions of friendship, Vickelhadge told Smith he expected “for his Weight, 
Trouble, and Influence, an American built Schooner of 12 Guns.”38 
O’Bryen urged Carmichael, the American consul in Spain, to push Congress to 
appoint a diplomat to Algiers with “as extensive Powers as possible.”39  Arguing that 
Vickelhadge “sways the whole Regency as he thinks proper,” O’Bryen believed the 
“Question is will America give Cruisers and Maritime stores to this Regency to make a 
Peace[?]”  If not, then Algiers will get their ships and stores elsewhere and continue 
targeting American shipping.40 
Soon after, O’Bryen contacted Carmichael again.  Claiming domestic troubles in 
both Britain and France meant that they could not hinder American interests to the same 
degree, he pointed to Spain’s fear of war with Algiers as an opportunity to benefit the 
United States.  With war pending against a European power, Algiers would need cruisers.  
O’Bryen claimed, “I cannot perceive that ever a more favorable Opportunity offered for 
America to make a Peace than the present.”41 
Though O’Bryan declared Spain’s peace was “very dishonorable and impolitic,” 
Algiers held to it only for “the vast Sums of Money and Presents given, which are 
sufficient to almost tempt these People to adore Lucifer.”42  O’Bryen’s estimated that 
Spain paid over $4.5 million in “Presents and Redemptions” from June 1785 to May 
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1790.  This total included at least $32,000 paid to Vickelhadge for his assistance in 
making peace, making the gift of an American-built schooner seem inexpensive.43 
Although price, for either redemption or war, was a major factor for Congress, 
lack of action had a cost its own.  O’Bryen calculated that insurance for American 
shipping ran “upwards of one million Sterling, which Sum the British Nation gets by 
insuring American Property on Account of our not being at Peace with the Barbary 
States.”44  Such a price dwarfed the highest estimates for ransoming the captives. 
For the next year, the Americans remained captive in Algiers and the United 
States’ government took no action.  O’Bryen again offered his advice directly to 
Congress.  Writing in April 1791, O’Bryen reported the latest ransom price as 34,450 
Spanish milled dollars.45  He condemned his government’s constant asking for quotes, 
claiming the Algerines took such requests as disingenuous and reduced their faith in the 
Americans.46 
Conditions in Algiers had changed greatly since Americans first became captives 
in 1785.  In 1786, there were three thousand Christian slaves in Algiers.  By the time of 
O’Bryen’s letter in 1791, only seven hundred remained.  Algiers had ransomed many 
Europeans, and a great many others died in “the pest, that great storm of mortality” in 
1787-1788, including six Americans.47  This caused prices to rise, as the slaves become 
precious commodities rather than sources of ransom.  Seeing as how the slaves performed 
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both hard labor and important administrative duties, Algiers was loath to part with those 
remaining. 
O’Bryen also feared a change in the international political situation.  While 
Britain and France remained embroiled in turmoil, both internally and with each other, 
Portugal sought peace with Algiers.  The Portuguese had been at war with Algiers for 
longer than the Americans and provided military assistance in blocking the Straits of 
Gibraltar.  Without this deterrent, Algiers would have no impediment to sailing past the 
Straits and attacking shipping in the Atlantic.  O’Bryen estimated that the United States 
would need to build or procure eight to ten vessels to patrol the Straits.  Without such a 
force, no company would insure American property for less than 25 percent of their 
cargo’s value.48  Without the power to blockade the Straits, he also worried that Algerine 
ships would eventually patrol off the coast of the United States.  However little gain the 
United States would “[derive] by being at war with the Barbary States … being at peace, 
[had] many advantages, [including] extended and beneficial commerce.”49 
With Spain the latest country to ransom its citizens, many in the United States 
feared that the cost of ransoming the American captives would increase.  O’Bryen 
estimated that peace would cost the United States between 50,000 and 60,000 pounds 
Sterling, with an additional 15,000 pounds Sterling for Tunis.  O’Bryen insisted that the 
United States should link Tunis, as a tributary to Algiers, in any peace treaty.50  He 
offered two solutions.  First, he suggested that the United States supply naval stores in 
lieu of cash.  Second, he suggested that the United States buy passports of safe conduct 
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from the Algerines and sell them to merchants wishing to trade in the Mediterranean.  
This would help to defray any costs from tribute or ransom, while providing trade 
protection.51  O’Bryen also offered that the American government make any peace in the 
form of an annual tribute, rather than a large sum.  Given the Algerine propensity to 
accept tribute payments for peace and then restart the conflict, O’Bryen worked to bind 
the Algerines to peace by extending the receipt of tribute over several years.52  Closing a 
letter written to Congress in April 1791, O’Bryen issued one last plea.  Hoping Congress 
would “consider What our sufferings must have been… [for] nearly six years captivity,” 
he again advised negotiating with Algiers.53 
Jefferson continued his attempts to better American relations with Barbary.  In 
1792, he appointed John Paul Jones to be the “Commissioner to treat with Algiers” on the 
subjects of peace and redemption of prisoners.54  Jefferson explained the problems 
encountered by previous diplomats, saying that the multitude of people attempting help 
has, “though undertaken with good intentions, run directly counter to our plan” to give 
the appearance of indifference to the Algerines.55  Causing the opposite reaction, Algiers 
considered these entreaties to be official and expected the United States to pay record 
prices for their captives.56  While Washington and Congress expected results, Jefferson 
made it very clear that “no ransom is to take place without a peace.”57 
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Algiers was not the only threat in North Africa.  The other three regencies, though 
much smaller and less powerful than Algiers, also posed problems.  The next potential 
issue was with Morocco.  The United States had signed a treaty of friendship with the 
Emperor of Morocco shortly after the American Revolution; however, the emperor died 
in 1790.  Following the local customs, all countries had to renew their treaties with the 
new emperor to remain in effect.  Jefferson immediately recommended that the United 
States dispatch an agent to offer presents and renew diplomatic ties with Morocco.  
Geography made that country a potentially dangerous enemy as it controlled coasts on 
both the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea.58 
Using the previous agreement as a basis, the United States offered a treaty with 
presents in the range of $10,000 to the Emperor of Morocco.  President Washington 
appointed Thomas Barclay, already consul at Morocco, as the chief diplomat to the new 
emperor’s court.  Specifically, the United States soughta continuation of the previous 
treaty.59  Barclay sailed back to Morocco with this objective, but found the situation more 
chaotic.  The late emperor’s sons were involved in a bloody succession struggle, leaving 
the country without an effective government.60 
Barclay, while still at Gibraltar, received information on the situation in 
Morocco.61  He relayed a story of the late emperor’s two sons.  The elder son, Muley 
Yezid, took sanctuary to “avoid the resentment of his father,” who immediately ordered 
his younger son, Muley Slama, to lay siege to the place and force Yezid to surrender.  
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However, before Slama succeeded, the emperor and northern Morocco and its major 
cities proclaimed Yezid as successor.  To avoid his brother’s vengeance, Slama placed 
himself in sanctuary.62 
Despite this uncertainty, Barclay intended complete his mission to Morocco.  
Before doing so, he contracted a disease and died.  A letter to Jefferson from James 
Simpson, United States consul in Gibraltar, showed that by 1793 the situation in Morocco 
was even more chaotic:  another prince, Muley Soliman, was contending for the throne.63 
Jefferson’s time as Secretary of State ended on 31 December 1793 with his 
resignation from Washington’s cabinet.  Retiring to Monticello to continue its never-
ending reconstruction, Jefferson spent more time fretting about French and British affairs 
than about piracy.  During his absence, American agents finally made progress:  in 1795, 
the new Moroccan emperor renewed his father’s treaty and the Algerian Dey finally 
signed a peace treaty that freed the American captives.64  David Humphreys, the 
American consul in Lisbon and agent for Barbary negotiations, managed to keep both 
treaties within Jefferson’s original instructions; there was nominal tribute, partially paid 
in naval stores, and no annual payments.65 
Even with his election as Vice President in 1796, Jefferson said little in relation to 
Barbary.  James Madison, having just left his seat in the House of Representatives, had 
given him regular updates on the previous treaties as the Senate debated them, but 
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Jefferson barely deigned to mention them.  The United States secured peace with all the 
Barbary States as they signed treaties with both Tripoli66 and Tunis67 in 1796-1797. 
Jefferson’s time between diplomat and President spanned a full decade.  
Continuing his call for action while in France, Jefferson used his office as Secretary of 
State to press for a resolution with Barbary, preferably without tribute.  Although he had 
resigned by the time the treaties were finalized, his ideas influenced the outcome.  The 
treaty with Algiers did not include an annual tribute (though it could not escape the 
custom of large gifts) and the new emperor of Morocco agreed to honor the treaty his 
father signed.  Shortly after Jefferson’s departure as Secretary of State, Congress passed 
legislation authorizing the creation of a navy to protect American interests.  When 
Jefferson assumed office as President on 4 March 1801, the country remained at peace 
with all four Barbary States and enjoyed full trading rights in the Mediterranean for the 
first time since the English Navy ceased protecting American shipping in the 1770s.  This 
would not remain for long.  Unlike earlier times, President Jefferson now had the office 
and the authority to act.
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
“CHASTISE THEIR INSOLENCE”:   
JEFFERSON AS PRESIDENT, 1801-1805 
 
 On Jefferson’s first day in office, the United States was at peace with the world.  
The war with Algiers had ended five years earlier, while the Quasi War with France had 
ended in 1800.  Although his inaugural address preached peace and reconciliation as 
themes, Jefferson wasted little time in taking action against his old foes. 
 The Quasi War with France caused the United States to expand its navy beyond 
the original scope of the 1794 legislation meant to combat Algiers.  The United States’ 
Navy now had several frigates not serving in combat.  For the first time in its history, the 
United States could project some measure of power beyond its shores.  This option 
directly affected the scope of Jefferson’s conflict with Barbary. 
 Within a week of becoming president, Jefferson suggested to his Cabinet the
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United States send an armed force to the Mediterranean to end the tribute system with the 
Barbary States.1  In a debate that shaped events of the year, Secretary of State James 
Madison and Secretary of War Henry Dearborn wanted to authorize the force to attack 
any vessel that threatened American commerce.2  Although Attorney General Levi 
Lincoln anticipated sending a squadron for a “demonstration of our power to reduce the 
capricious Sovereigns of Barbary to a new sense of justice,”3 he gave the legal opinion 
that Jefferson could not send the force “to attack any foreign vessel without the approval 
and authorization of Congress.”4  Without consensus, Jefferson tabled his proposal. 
 It would not remain so for long.  Within weeks, the United States learned that 
Tripoli had resumed the capture of American shipping in the Mediterranean in October 
1800.5  Following these actions, the Pasha6 of Tripoli demanded more tribute than the 
Treaty of 1797 allowed.  Richard O’Bryen, former captive and now Consul General at 
Algiers, reported in April 1801 that the Pasha, Yusuf Karamanli, had “ordered his 
Cruisers to Sea with [a hostile] Intention to Capture American Vessels [and] make Slaves 
of the Citizens of the U.S.”7  William Eaton, Consul at Tunis, confirmed the news several 
days later.  Knowing the consequences of continued hostility, Eaton wrote that “if the 
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United States will have a free commerce in this sea they must defend it: There is no 
alternative.  The restless spirit of these marauders cannot be restrained.”8 
Jefferson knew that “there [was] no end to the demand of these powers, nor any 
security in their promises.”9  To him, the United States had only two options:  withdraw 
from the Mediterranean and abandon any commercial activities there or send a fleet to 
protect American interests.10  To resolve the American position, the President reconvened 
his Cabinet.  In a 15 May meeting, Jefferson posed two questions:  Should the United 
States send a naval squadron to the Mediterranean and what would be the purpose of the 
cruise?  Attorney General Lincoln reiterated his position that American forces could 
defend themselves but “may not proceed to destroy the enemy’s vessels generally” 
without the permission of Congress.11  The rest of the Cabinet disagreed, arguing that 
Jefferson was only responding to a declaration of war and not making one of his own.  
His role as commander-in-chief required that he defend the country and its commerce.  
Treasury Secretary Albert Gallatin argued that the executive “can not put us in a state of 
war, but if we be put into that state ... by the other nation, the command [and] direction of 
the public force then belongs to the [President].”12   
With everyone in agreement, Jefferson authorized Robert Smith13 to dispatch 
three frigates and a sloop to the Mediterranean.  Jefferson ordered the squadron, led by 
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Commodore Richard Dale, to show “that the views of your [government] are perfectly 
friendly” unless Tripoli had already declared war, in which case the warships should 
“chastise their insolence—by sinking, burning or destroying their ships wherever you 
shall find them.”14 
Even while sending the ships to protect American commerce, Jefferson and his 
administration remained careful of the political situation both domestically and abroad.  
Though Jefferson’s instructions included the command to “chastise insolence,” he 
handicapped the power of his naval commanders by prohibiting offensive action without 
congressional approval.  This included the release of any prisoners taken in battle and the 
release of any ship captured, albeit after disabling it.15   
Internationally, Secretary of State Madison instructed the consuls in Algiers and 
Tunis to keep those regencies neutral.  Madison stressed that any war the United States 
engaged in was one of “defence [sic] and necessity, not of choice or provocation.”16  
Worried about starting a general war, the American government confirmed its dedication 
to the existing peace treaties with the other regencies.  Jefferson stated that the American 
government would adhere to those agreements, even “the tributes and humiliations,” but 
would only follow “what the laws impose on us … nothing more.”17 
Following Dale’s arrival in the Mediterranean in July 1801, he blockaded 
Tripoli’s harbor.  For most of the year, there were simultaneous blockades of Tripoli and 
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of a Tripolitan cruiser in Gibraltar’s harbor.18  The first test of Jefferson’s policy came in 
August 1801.  The schooner USS Enterprise captured a Tripolitan corsair of fourteen 
guns and eighty men.  Even though the Pasha was “much mortified, that so small a vessel 
should take one of his corsairs,” Jefferson’s orders meant the ship did not leave Tripolitan 
hands.  After disabling all its guns and hindering its ability to sail, the Enterprise released 
the ship and crew.19 
To this point, Jefferson had not convened Congress.  They were in recess and he 
believed that the Constitution allowed him to respond defensively.  Jefferson waited until 
the legislature reconvened later in the year.20  In his annual message to Congress in 
December 1801, Jefferson requested approval to undertake full-scale operations against 
Tripoli.  Declaring Tripoli’s demands “unfounded either in right or in compact,” 
Jefferson informed Congress of his decision to send the squadron to “dispel ... the 
danger” of American commerce in both the Mediterranean and Atlantic.21  Using the 
experience of the Enterprise as an example, Jefferson wrote:   
Unauthorized by the Constitution, without the sanction of Congress, to go 
beyond the line of defense, the [Tripolitan] vessel, being disabled from 
committing further hostilities, was liberated with its crew.  The Legislature 
will doubtless consider whether, by authorizing measures of offense also, 
they will place our force on an equal footing with that of its adversaries.22 
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This request, ridiculed by his political opponents, exposed Jefferson’s dilemma:  He was 
“torn between his acknowledged abhorrence of the Barbary States and the unexplored 
constitutional questions of how to respond officially if hostilities arose.”23 
 Alexander Hamilton, as Jefferson’s chief adversary, lambasted Jefferson’s 
position on the state of offensive operations and his commander’s decision to release all 
Tripolitan ships and crew.  Claiming it to be “one of the most singular paradoxes ever 
advanced,” Hamilton wrote that the decision “amounts to nothing less than this, that 
between two nations there may exist a state of complete war on the one side [and] of 
peace on the other.”24  Continuing the theme, Hamilton stressed that a declaration or act 
of war did not require concurrent acts of acceptance by the two parties involved. 25  
 While Hamilton continued to complain about Jefferson’s “blemish on our national 
character,”26 Congress began the process of granting the president power to prosecute the 
war.  Samuel Smith27 of Maryland introduced a resolution within a week of Jefferson’s 
address.  Smith wanted to empower the president and allow him to “be authorized by law, 
further and more effectually to protect the commerce of the United States against the 
Barbary Powers.”28  Though there was some debate about whether the measure allowed 
Jefferson to increase the size of the armed forces, Representative Smith reiterated that his 
intent was simply “to authorize the President, with the present force, to take measures for 
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the defence [sic] of our trade.”29  Smith and Jefferson feared that Algiers and Tunis 
would join the conflict.  Without congressional authorization, the president remained 
constrained to a defensive position and unable to respond to any additional threats.  With 
a Democratic-Republican majority in both houses of Congress, the resolution passed 
giving Jefferson authority to take the offensive against Barbary. 30 
 With congressional approval, Jefferson won the political battle.  While he 
advocated a conflict to, at least, force an end to tribute, he was setting a precedent for the 
future.  There had been no declared wars fought since the country’s independence and 
Congress had sanctioned action against French warships threatening American commerce 
during the Quasi War.  Jefferson was hesitant to engender political criticism by 
overreaching his authority.  By putting American forces on the defensive and waiting for 
congressional approval for offensive actions, Jefferson ensured that his opponents could 
not accuse him of beginning the war.  
 With full power, Jefferson moved quickly from the defensive to the offensive.  
Prior to the resolutions, the United States’ Navy remained handicapped and instituted 
blockades rather than seeking out enemy vessels.  For the several months before the 
congressional resolution, American envoys in North Africa and Europe pushed to 
increase American activity in the Mediterranean.  Consul Eaton wrote to Secretary 
Madison in September 1801 stating that he had contacted “the rightful Bashaw of 
Tripoli.”31  Exiled in Tunis, Hamet Karamanli lost control of the country to his brother, 
Yusuf, who then exiled him.  Eaton advocated an American force to assist Hamet in 
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reclaiming Tripoli in exchange for a more favorable peace.  Without providing evidence, 
Eaton declared that the people in Tripoli were “ripe for revolt” and only needed 
“confidence in the prospect of success.”  Eaton offered further incentive for supporting 
Hamet by stating the Bey of Tunis favored him over Yusuf.32   
 From 1801 to 1804, the United States’ Navy blockaded Tripoli and cruised along 
the North African coast.  The American policy was to contain as many ships as possible 
with attacks only occurring in open waters.  This was likely because, during the opening 
years of the war, the United States Navy was limited to the several frigates and sloops left 
over from the Quasi War with France.  In 1804, the administration authorized a change in 
policy that altered the outcome.  That year saw one of the most heralded events of the 
nascent American military history with the burning and sinking of the stricken USS 
Philadelphia.  The Philadelphia ran aground in October 1803 while pursuing a Tripolitan 
corsair.  After grounding on a reef outside Tripoli’s harbor, The Philadelphia surrendered 
when its defense was no longer possible.33  By February 1804, Captain Edward Preble 
decided to act on a plan to destroy the Philadelphia and deny its use to the enemy.  He 
selected Lieutenant Stephen Decatur of the USS Enterprize for the mission.  Using a 
captured corsair, Decatur and his men boarded the stricken frigate and set it on fire, 
culminating with an explosion that ended any enemy attempt at using the Philadelphia.34 
 The American war effort continued when William Eaton proposed to launch an 
invasion of Tripoli in support of the exiled Hamet Karamanli.  Eaton hoped to raise and 
command a force that would march from Egypt and invade the area of Derne, before 
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ultimately marching on Tripoli.35  By appointing Eaton as navy agent “for the several 
Barbary Regencies,” the Secretary of the Navy placed him under the command of 
Commodore Samuel Barron.36  Eaton proposed something new for American foreign 
policy:  an invasion of a foreign country.  His intelligence reported Tripoli on the verge 
of revolt and ready to follow the exiled Hamet Bashaw against his brother.37  Though the 
assault would be American led, logistics kept a large American force from Tripoli.  Eaton 
devised a plan where he and a few United States’ Marines would lead a force of 
mercenaries, supplemented by Hamet’s followers, in an overland march against Tripoli.38 
 Eaton, acting as diplomat in addition to commander, knew that the United States 
needed an arrangement with Hamet Bashaw that would codify future American-
Tripolitan relations.  Negotiating from a position of strength, Eaton concluded a 
“convention” with Hamet,39  cementing a “firm and perpetual Peace” between the United 
States and Hamet Bashaw, promising the United States would use the “utmost exertions” 
to reinstall him as Bashaw in Tripoli.40  Eaton, knowing Hamet needed American help to 
regain his throne, secured a revolutionary change in Barbary practices.  He demanded and 
received the tribute of Denmark, Sweden, and the Batavian Republic41 as indemnities for 
American losses.  This was in addition to the release of all American captives and the 
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agreement that all future wars would use a system of prisoners of war rather than captive 
slaves.42 
 The year 1805 saw the culmination of Jefferson’s two decade-long against the 
pirates.  On 6 March, William Eaton and Hamet Bashaw marched from Alexandria with 
over 350 men, including 8 United States Marines.43  While overwhelmingly foreign in 
numbers, this marked the first time that American forces fought on foreign soil.  Over the 
course of the next three months, Eaton and his motley force would do as Jefferson had 
preached for two decades:  they would take the fight to Barbary. 
 By the end of April, Eaton had not only crossed into Tripoli but had also captured 
the second-largest city, Derne.44  With the city in his possession, the United States’ Navy 
could directly supply the force with food and weapons.  Unfortunately, the drive stalled 
as Yusuf Bashaw sent forces to lay Derne under siege.  With the stalemate reaching into 
late-May, Eaton’s superiors lost confidence in Hamet Bashaw’s ability to lead the 
revolt/invasion.  Captain Samuel Barron informed Eaton that due to Hamet’s “lack of 
drive to contest his brother,” the United States was no longer required.45  Barron’s 
attitude derived from his perception that Hamet lacked strength.  Declaring that the exiled 
Bashaw “must be considered as no longer a fit subject for our support and Cooperation,” 
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Barron was adamant that the United States not lead a full-scale invasion of Tripoli.46  
Seeing an opportunity with Eaton’s capture of Derne, Barron instructed Tobias Lear to 
negotiate with Yusuf for peace.47 
 Eaton argued Hamet’s cause to no avail.  The American agent said that Hamet 
had the support of the population and that Yusuf feared his brother, not the Americans.48  
The sudden abandonment of Hamet angered Eaton, who declared that Barron’s decision 
could not “be reconciled to those principles of honor and justice which, I know, actuate 
the national breast.”49  Eaton, by the words of the Secretary of the Navy and Captain 
Barron himself, encouraged Hamet to leave his exile and return to Tripoli “under an 
expectation of receiving aids [sic] from [the United States] to prosecute his views of 
recovering his throne.”50  Beyond his personal attachment to Hamet, Eaton feared that a 
failed negotiation, coupled with the abandonment of Derne, would cripple American 
fortunes in the Mediterranean.51  Little did Eaton know that Consul-General Lear had 
already succeeded in his mission. 
 After receiving his orders, Lear proceeded directly to Tripoli and joined 
Commodore John Rodgers outside the harbor.  Yusuf first sent the Spanish consul Don 
Gerardo Joseph de Souza and then Danish consul Nicholas C. Nissen to negotiate on his 
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behalf.52  Lear demanded that the Bashaw return all captive Americans in exchange for 
all Tripolitans in American custody, in addition to $60,000 for the difference in numbers.  
On that basis, Lear and Nissen signed a treaty of peace on 4 June 1805 that ended the first 
foreign war in American history.53  The treaty called for the end of all hostilities, the 
mutual release of prisoners, the withdrawal of all Americans “in hostility against the 
Bashaw of Tripoli,” and the end of any supply to Hamet or those loyal to him.54 
 President Jefferson submitted the treaty to the Senate for ratification in December 
1805.55  Writing to Congress in his annual message, Jefferson declared, “In a government 
bottomed on the will of all, the life and liberty of every individual citizen become 
interesting to all.”56  Taking this idea seriously, Jefferson had just become the first 
American president to dispatch troops overseas to conduct a military operation.  
Although the operation was small and only partially successful, was unwilling to watch 
as Americans remained in captivity while their government did nothing.  Although he did 
not destroy Tripoli or end the Barbary menace, he had achieved more than any previous 
president.  He managed to project American strength across the Atlantic and forced a 
peace that did not require annual tribute, a rarity for any nation.
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
By the end of 1805, the United States stood alone in how it handled the threat of 
Barbary piracy.  With the decision to fight the enemy directly, the United States changed 
two centuries of European acquiescence to the North African threat.  Thomas Jefferson, 
through two decades of public service, led this American charge.  Though known as a 
man of reason and peace, Jefferson expended enormous effort in getting the United States 
to take an aggressive stance against piracy. 
Jefferson’s historical reputation as a pacifist remains as, throughout his career, he 
argued against a strong permanent military.  He believed that a large standing army 
would go from protecting the country to controlling it, while a strong navy would embroil 
the United States in foreign wars.  In place of a navy with large warships, such as the 
frigates built under Adams, Jefferson proposed a navy of gunboats.  These were small 
ships for harbor and coastal defense, rather than a force capable of battling on the high
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seas.  During his administration, the United States’ Navy built 157 gunboats to protect the 
American coast.  Jefferson’s policy failed because the ships were more expensive than 
projected, often rotted during storage, and were ineffective in coastal defense.1 
Jefferson’s reputation as a pacifist is not entirely justified.  Although neither in 
favor of a large military force nor pursuing war, Jefferson understood the necessary time 
and place for such action.  The campaign against Barbary piracy stands out most, but 
Jefferson prepared for conflict against Britain after the Chesapeake crisis in 1807.  
Dumas Malone sums up this historical error, observing “the designation of him 
[Jefferson] as a prophet of pacifism is unwarranted, but he was unquestionably a major 
prophet of non-involvement in world affairs.  For his own time and generation it was 
basically a wise policy.”2  Jefferson’s own words showed he believed the way “to prevent 
those [wars] produced by the wrongs of other nations … [was to put] ourselves in a 
condition to punish them.  Weakness provokes insult and injury, while a condition to 
punish it often prevents it.”3 
The common example of his pacifism was his conduct during the crisis with the 
United Kingdom in 1807.  During Britain’s war with France, the Royal Navy used 
impressment to return deserters to service.  In many cases, the British targeted American 
merchant vessels.  This caused outrage throughout the United States and led many to 
demand war in retaliation.4  Contrary to international law, the Royal Navy stopped the 
American warship USS Chesapeake.  After Captain Samuel Barron refused a British 
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boarding party, the HMS Leopard opened fire on the Chesapeake, killing three and 
wounding ten American sailors.  The captain of the Leopard then took four sailors he 
claimed were British deserters.5  In spite of this, Jefferson maintained that only Congress 
could declare war and did not recall Congress from its adjournment.6  Jefferson refused to 
succumb to these pressures to go to war.  Instead, the president attempted a policy that 
asserted the American rights as a sovereign nation and avoided a costly and difficult war. 
Citing Jefferson, Dumas Malone noted “Congress would take up the question 
whether ‘War, Embargo or Nothing’ should be the nation’s course” and that Jefferson 
was “disposed to take the middle way.”7  Jefferson actually vacillated on the topic.  By 
waiting for a British response rather than using force immediately, Secretary of the 
Treasury Albert Gallatin wrote to Jefferson “that war … would neither have been 
recognized abroad as justifiable nor sanctioned by public opinion at home.”8   
Following Napoleon’s closing of continental Europe to British goods, even on 
American ships, and Britain’s decision for more impressment, the United States faced a 
very difficult choice.  No longer confined to one potential enemy, the United States now 
faced strained relations with France as well.  In late 1807, Jefferson and his Cabinet 
decided against war and pushed for the implementation of an embargo of all European 
trade.  Congress passed this measure in December and the Embargo Act of 1807 closed 
American ports to British and French (which now included most of continental Europe) 
commerce.  Calling it a “dignified retirement within ourselves,” Jefferson claimed that 
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the embargo would “have the collateral effect of making it to the interest of all nations to 
change the system which has driven [American] commerce from the ocean.”9  
Jefferson’s consistent attitudes toward and about Barbary do not fit neatly with his 
other views.  In essence, his consistency against Barbary actually showed his 
inconsistency throughout his career.  Although he had regularly argued against going to 
war with Britain and France, Jefferson showed no hesitation in calling for action against 
the Barbary regencies.  Jefferson did not go into this possible contradiction or why he 
was so adamant against Barbary.  It is entirely possible that the difference rests solely on 
the strength of the opponent, as the Barbary States were much weaker than Britain, 
France, or Spain. 
Throughout his career, but particularly as a diplomat in the 1780s, Jefferson used 
honor as a justification for conflict with Barbary.  As a member of the southern elite, 
Jefferson understood the concept of honor very well.  Bertram Wyatt-Brown describes 
honor as existing “in intimate relation to its opposite:  shame.”10  He goes on to say that 
“When shame was imposed by others, honor was stripped away.”11  This fit Jefferson’s 
descriptions of Barbary action, American inaction, and European views of the situation.  
Jefferson was extremely concerned with the idea that Europe viewed the United States 
unfavorably.12 
Jefferson also did not use slavery comparisons to describe the plight of the 
American captives.  In The Crescent Obscured studies, Robert Allison explores how 
                                                           
9
 Ibid., 488. 
10
 Bertram Wyatt-Brown, Honor and Violence in the Old South (New York:  Oxford University 
Press, 1986), viii.  
11
 Ibid. 
12
 Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, 6 February 1785, in Papers, VII:  640. 
72 
 
many Americans described the captive sailors in terms of slavery.  The idea of white 
slavery (white usually equating Christian) was not a new concept, but existed during the 
centuries preceding American independence.  Robert C. Davis explores this idea 
admirably in Christian Slaves, Muslim Masters.13  Jefferson, already aware of his 
contradiction between advocate of liberty and slaveholder, did not cast these events in 
racial overtones.  Unfortunately, he did not explore the idea or offer any explanations for 
or against this concept of Americans as slaves. 
Jefferson did place significance on the commercial prospects of the United States.  
Jefferson understood just how much the export trade mattered to the United States, for 
both the agriculture of the South and the merchants of New England.  Jefferson realized 
that the Mediterranean was a huge market for the United States as the pre-Revolution 
colonies had shipped substantial amounts of rice and flour, as well as indigo to the 
region.14 
Perhaps most interesting about this entire saga is the constitutional questions 
posed by Jefferson’s actions.  This was not first time would Jefferson act near or beyond 
his limits, or ask Congress to ratify his actions after the fact.  Much like the Louisiana 
Purchase in 1803, Jefferson’s decision to send a squadron to the Mediterranean without a 
declaration of war was difficult.  Jefferson’s role as the proponent of limited government 
did not equate to a refusal to act. 
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Jefferson’s crusade against Barbary was long and difficult, but he never wavered 
in his determination to act and act strongly.  Whether pushing for resolve as a junior 
diplomat or ordering action as the president, Jefferson advocated and then implemented a 
plan that showed United States’ resolve.  Though he did not end the problem of Barbary 
piracy, he made it possible for its destruction within a generation.  Where kings and 
queens paid tribute, Thomas Jefferson refused.  
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